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Abstract—Software agents are the delegated subcontractors
essential to connect the end-user to the bank and payment
providers in a distributed service offering. This paper evaluates
the key role that the different software agent types play to
facilitate collaboration between clients and banks to perform
online transactions. It highlights the threats and imminent risks
that these software agents introduce in the chain as well as how
these threats affect the trust relationship between principals.
The discussed threats and resulting risks suggest vulnerabilities
in the current software agent model which are beyond the
bank and end users control. Both principals, the client and
the service provider, are open to potential legal, security,
quality of service, confidentiality and privacy compromises
which influence the overarching trust relationship. There is
resounding literature to illustrate advances that have been
made to address the exposed challenges. However, a gap of
misfortune remains where the software agent can act on its
own accord exposing the contracting principals to internal and
externally engineered threats thus tainting the trust relation-
ship between these parties.
1. Introduction
The transformation of banking and payment services
from bricks and mortar to electronic channels has yielded
some efficiencies to the industry, including financial and
economic benefits. Online platforms offer reduced costs for
servicing a large client base through a distributed network
in the form of Internet Banking or e-commerce shopping
and check-out platforms [1]. Customers can perform nu-
merous banking and payment type transactions, such as
money transfers; and bill payments, and purchase value-
added services and view their balance, from anywhere in
the world which they would otherwise have to perform
inside a physical branch and at a fixed geographic location.
Although security is of concern, the client sees benefits
through convenience and accessibility, being able to transact
from anywhere anytime [2].
Internet based servicing essentially brings the branch
closer to a wider client base at a fraction of the cost
in comparison to servicing a physical branch in all the
respective client locations. To enable online transacting, the
client engagement with the service provider occurs through
a third-party agent in the form of a web browser, desktop
or mobile application [3]. A client wishing to purchase
goods from an online retailer on his computer must first
launch a browser agent, such as Internet Explorer, and
then shop through an online mall agent, such as Amazon,
until they locate the right product and complete the sale.
This remote anonymous collaboration between the client,
agent and service provider presents many challenges, such
as the client’s ability to ascertain surety and confidence
that he is transacting with an authentic provider who will
deliver the acquired services. Additionally, the client wants
to be satisfied that he’s conducting the transaction through
a reliable and secure agent channel that will treat his data
with the expected protection and care. On the other hand,
banks and payment providers use authentication to satisfy
themselves that they are engaging with an authentic client
[4]. Authentication is a process of verifying the users per-
sonal identity by means of matching personal and secondary
credentials with the users profile, be it in person or remotely.
There are some authentication models and methodologies
available to service providers, from single-factor to multi-
factor authentication schemes [5], [6].
From whatever perspective one looks at it, and
whichever authentication system is employed, there is al-
ways the threat of intruders intercepting the internet session
to steal the clients login credentials to perform malicious
acts. Sometimes the intruder is agent itself misusing the
collected transaction data, login credentials and personal
data for other uses and gains outside the intended purpose
[3]. Therefore, even when security measures like SSL and
certificate protocols are an effective means to secure the
channel and authenticate the agent there remains a potential
data leak from the agent itself [7], [8]. Vamialis [9] poses a
compelling analogy that if login credentials are synonymous
to a house key, what is the likelihood of leaving the house
key in an unsafe environment where any outsider could get
access to it?
This research examines the threats posed by software
agents in the online banking and payments context. We look
at potential threats, challenges and vulnerabilities that such
software agent model exhibits to both the client and service
provider as well as table the current remedies and rating
score of the threats. This paper is organised as follows: The
following section discusses the different types of software
agents involved in a typical internet banking and payment
transaction. Then we provide an analysis of the threats
posed by the defined software agents. Finally, we provide a
summary and conclusions of our findings.
2. Software Agents in online Payments
The earliest definition of an agent can be derived from
Carl Hewitt’s proposal of the actor model’ [10]. Hewitt
defines an Actor as an independent control structure that
acts on received messages and relays these messages to
other Actors in the system through established protocol and
having the following two characteristics and properties of
operation: “the ACTION it should take when it is sent a
message” and “its ACQUAINTANCES which is the finite
collection of actors that it directly KNOWS ABOUT.”
Nwana provides a modern definition of an agent and
which is more descriptive and relevant to this researchs
context [11]: “we define an agent as referring to a compo-
nent of software and/or hardware which is capable of acting
exactingly to accomplish tasks on behalf of its user.”
Software agent performs computational tasks and rou-
tine work on behalf of the user or employing entity [11].
Software agents are the bridge, the channel and the essen-
tial go-between that brings the client and service provider
together into a virtual marketplace, bank branch, advertising
catalogue or social platform.
2.1. Types of Software Agents
There are different software agent types in the path
of a transaction when considering online payments and
banking. A typical transaction between a client and their
bank would be conducted via the web browser on a public
network which in turn encapsulates the virtual payment
as the transaction transverses from the server to server,
router to router until its final destination. Following Nwana
[11], we identify the agent types depicted in Fig. 1, which
are classified according to the role that they play in the
processing of a banking and payment transaction between
the user and service provider.
Figure 1. Agents classification in online payments
Client Application Agent. This software agent acts as
the users main interface into online hosted banking and
payment services. In the context of this research, the web
browser is the most commonly used client agent. However,
mobile applications are becoming more and more prevalent
as seen in the likes of mobile banking and marketplace ap-
plications. The penetration of internet based user resources
and the exponential growth of cloud services such as Gmail
accounts, Facebook, PayPal has warranted the need to share
access to these resources amongst different applications.
Authentication protocols such as OAuth enable third party
applications to become software agents and consume hosted
services from another service provider [12]. In addition
to access to the actual website, OAuth is a typical exam-
ple of the interface function performed through the client
application agent when used to facilitate a payment, for
example through PayPal or a Two Factor Authentication
(2FA) provider [5].
Networking Agent. This is the software and firmware
code that packages the payment data message into the many
different messaging, network and encryption protocols. For
example, the web browser embeds a networking agent that
captures the application and user data to/from HTML and
may go as far as to negotiate an SSL session with the
destination application server on behalf of the user [3]. User
self-securing schemes such as The Onion Routing (TOR)
also become networking agents as they wrap and unwrap
the onion on its way to and from the final destination [13].
Server Application Agent. This is the web application,
which resides on the banks servers, and may execute on the
users browser to facilitate the online banking and payment
transactions. The key attribute of a server application agent
is its mobility or ability to be hosted centrally and be
executed remotely. For example, the amazon.com website
is a server application agent which collaborates with the
browser client application agent to enable the trading of
goods on that website.
Authorisation Agent. These are the account velocity
management and fraud monitoring systems that evaluate pre
and post transaction data to perform some intelligent logic
to notify and trigger a management or operational decision.
For example, when a payment transaction takes place the
bank and payment providers pass transaction data into their
account management authorisation agent software which in
turn would report if certain parameters have been exceeded
to alarm of a potential fraud or if the users account balance
is sufficient to honour the transaction.
2.2. A Typical Case Study
The defined agent types can be illustrated through a
typical online purchase transaction as depicted in Fig. 2.
It must be noted, however, that this use-case describes a
simplified process flow and that software agents can take
on multiple agency roles, depending on their function in the
chain. For example, a typical web browser can act as both
a client application and a networking agent.
In our use-case, a client seeking to purchase a book from
an e-commerce merchant such as Amazon.com conducts the
transaction through software agents that fulfil different roles
on behalf of the client. The client launches their browser,
enters the e-commerce URL and shops for their desired
book. Once selected, the client is prompted for payment
Figure 2. A typical online payment transaction
card details through the check-out process which in-turn
communicates with the client’s bank to fulfil payment.
Step i. The client initiates the Internet browser appli-
cation, such as Chrome or Internet Explorer. The browser
client application agent is responsible for interpreting and
presenting the HTML pages to the user as well as invok-
ing the networking agent when necessary to request and
post pages to/from the host server application. The browser
application serves the web pages of the online store and
relays the user purchase and session data to the retailer or
marketplace server through the networking agent.
Step ii.The networking agent collects the user and appli-
cation data messages and its purpose is to cipher, transport
and deliver these messages to the host server (and vice
versa) utilising the underlying network communication and
infrastructure which itself may comprise of a collection
of other networking agents, such as the popular OpenSSL
(https://www.openssl.org/). The data message is decoded
and encoded to conform to the respective systems messaging
and encryption protocols as it transverse the network until
it reaches the destination.
Step iii.The e-commerce web server encapsulates the
navigation, application and check-out process and it renders
the web pages remotely on the clients internet browser.
During the check-out process, the e-commerce website as-
sumes the payment function or delegates this to a proces-
sor, such as PayPal (www.paypal.com) or Amazon Pay-
ments (https://payments.amazon.co.uk/), which takes over
the capturing of the card or payment instrument details
and performs the actual payment authorization with the
respective issuing bank. The capturing of card payment
data is facilitated through the client application agent (the
browser) which serves as the interface agent between the
merchant, the bank and the end user.
Step iv. Finally, the bank receives the payment request to
authorise the transaction against the client’s account balance.
As part of this process, the authorisation agent validates the
payment information for fraud monitoring and performs ve-
locity tests to detect any anomalies in the client’s transacting
patterns and behaviour to alert the bank.
3. Software Agents Threat Modelling Tools
The prevalence of the internet of things and the fast
adoption of mobile devices is continually placing more
internet capable computers around people. Ubiquitous usage
of computers where users roam and consume the nearest
fixed or mobile online device to access their cloud resources
is now a reality. Software agents are the dominating tools
and common place to access and consume online services
and as such require serious attention and consideration to
privacy and personal data practices [3], [14].
The Microsoft STRIDE threat model is used to cate-
gorise the software agent threats while the DREAD system
is applied to rate the severity of identified threats [15], [16].
STRIDE Threat Model. The model is applied and
classified into the following payments and banking related
threats.
S = Spoofing/Deception, the threat of perpetrators ability
to illegally access a users banking account or payment
profile to transact as if they were the rightful owner of that
account, profile or payment instrument.
T = Tampering, the threat of tampering with the user or
provider data, be it during the transaction or data stored in
the provider’s database.
R = Repudiation, the threat of exposing the payment
provider or bank to false claims of liability.
I = Information Disclosure, the threat of unwillingly
exposing data to external parties and intruders.
D = Denial of service, the threat of disrupting the
legitimate user or provider from accessing their account or
completing the intended transaction or service in whole or
in part.
E = Escalation of Privileges, the threat of granting unau-
thorised access and rights to the banking account, payment
profile and instrument such that these impending users can
transact and act on the account as if fully trusted.
Figure 3. Presentation of threats and areas of vulnerability
DREAD Risk Model. The risk assessment model is
applied to each identified threat by assigning a severity score
of between 1 and 10 to the DREAD review components. The
final score of every identified threat is divided by 5 to obtain
an average scoring between 1 and 10. 1 indicates a low risk
while 10 indicates a high risk. The DREAD components
are:
D = Damage What is the prevalence of the problem and
how much damage can it cause?
R = Reliability How likely is the threat to succeed?
E = Exploitability How easy is it to exploit the threat?
A = Affected Users How many users does the threat
affect?
Di = Discoverability How easy is it to discover and fix?
A threat not likely to be discovered and/or hard to fix scores
high.
4. Threats Analysis of Payments Software
Agents
The case study described in section 2.2 is used to exem-
plify the threats to which each software agent type exposes
on a typical online payment and banking transaction. Figure
3 is a graphical representation of the identified threats and
areas of vulnerabilities. Table 1 is a listing of the identified
threats as analysed and prioritised per the DREAD rating.
The mitigations will be discussed in the next section.
The STRIDE Denial of Service (DoS) threat was not
considered in most of the analysed threats as it is the belief
of the authors that such an attack is relatively common and
easy to deploy nowadays. It is therefore assumed that any
of the discussed threats have a good potential to result in a
successful DoS attack. We argue, though, that a DoS threat
is of specific significance in the Man-in-the-browser threat
as it not only denies the rightful user access to services
but also threatens to alter the transaction data such that
an illegitimate recipient may benefit from the transaction
instead of the intended recipient.
4.1. Threat Analysis of Client Application Agent
This is the local application resident on the users com-
puter or mobile device. This is the most used and frequent
type of software agent that the user interacts with directly
when he/she wants to access online payment and banking
services. In this case, the user invokes their web browser
on their computer or mobile device to perform an online
purchase. The user types the web address (URL) of the
TABLE 1. THREAT ANALYSIS






T1 Internal software at-
tack, such as Man in
the browser attack
User personal, account, pay-
ment and login credentials are
leaked out which may result





9 Resolved through user education of dangerous
agents, whitelisting or blacklisting of the harmful
software agents as well as applying fuzzy logic to
detect and disable the malicious actors from access-
ing the system [17], [18]
T2 Software agent leak-
ing users information
User personal, account, pay-
ment and login credentials are
leaked out which may result




8 Agents ask the user for permission to access and use
the collected personal information for profiling and
other purposes [19]
T3 User unawareness
and general lack of
knowledge
User login credentials and per-
sonal data are exposed and




8 Resolved through user education of dangerous
agents, whitelisting or blacklisting of the harmful
software agents as well as applying fuzzy logic to
detect and disable the malicious actors from access-
ing the system [17], [18]
T4 Interception and data
alterations
This is the threat towards data
integrity. User personal, ac-
count, payment and login cre-
dentials are leaked out which




7 Employ symmetric or asymmetric encryption solu-
tions to secure the channel between the software




and threat to the
brand, reputation
and trust relationship
between the user and
the bank or payment
provider.
The clients lose trust in the
bank or service provider thus
turning their business else-
where. Clients may distrust the
electronic channels and mi-
grate back to the expensive
brick and mortar channels. The
reputation of the bank or ser-
vice provider is tainted.
S, T,
R, I, E
7 Currently, resolved through user education;
whitelisting or blacklisting of the harmful software
agents as well as applying fuzzy logic to detect
and disable the malicious actors from accessing the
system [17], [18]. We argue that this threat is not
addresses adequately mitigated at present.
T6 Decompiling, repack-
aging and simulation
of the software agent
code or application.
User login credentials are ex-
posed. The user transaction
data can be modified in the




6 Using cryptographic schemes to sign the original
code and scan and match the certificate for originally





The agent is compromised,
and client and provider data
is extracted for malicious use
as well as access to the user’s




6 Take precaution and measures to use good coding
practices to secure the application for the environ-






standard as well as
privacy laws.
Data protection and security
measures are weakened, and
the database and personal in-
formation is exposed and can
be leaked for malicious use.
S, T,
R, I, E
6 Publishing of standards as well ongoing audits to
ensure software agent providers comply. However,
some service providers with small transaction vol-
umes are not subjected to the same level of scrutiny.
User education of harmful agents; whitelisting or
blacklisting of the dangerous software agents as well
as applying fuzzy logic to detect and disable the
malicious actors from accessing the system [17],
[18].
e-commerce merchant into the browser, and the browser
application takes over the underlying HTTP protocol POST
and GET exchange until the merchant’s marketplace is fully
loaded.
The user interacts with the merchant’s online store inside
the browser application. The Browser application has full
and clear unencrypted access to all the data input fields such
as client selections, preferences, login credentials, billing
address, residential address, current geographic location,
account balance, transaction history, spending patterns, ac-
count settings, user profile and payment card information.
Some of this client personal information is input directly
by the user while others are retrieved from the merchants
stored database.
Furthermore, the browser application runs and operates
inside an environment such as Microsoft Windows, Android
or similar which may have direct access to the browser inter-
nal storage area. The following threats have been identified
which expose the user and payment or bank service provider
to vulnerabilities:
T1. User data inside the web browser or client ap-
plication agent is handled and presented in clear unen-
crypted form which enables internal software attacks such as
man-in-the-browser (MITB) that exploit, capture and share
private and sensitive information with the outside world
without the users permission or knowledge [18]. This can
be achieved by injecting malicious code through JavaScript,
browser extensions and web views.
T2. The browser application can leak information for
advertising, mining, user profiling and malicious use outside
the intended application. This leaked information can be
used to gain unauthorised access to the user’s bank or
payment account to syphon data for marketing or fraud
purposes as well as the possible escalation of privileges for
illicit use [22], [23].
T3. The unsuspecting user, and due to general lack
of knowledge, can install malicious browser plug-ins and
accept weak settings as well as incorrectly granting access
to the application to mine personal information or obtain
unwarranted access to the users banking account. This can
further extend to other threats using personal user informa-
tion to launch phishing attacks [24].
T4. The underlying objective of these defined threats
within the client application agent is the access to user
authentication credentials and personal information. User
data may be intercepted, leaked and modified resulting in
unintended results or unauthorised access to account and
payment information from the bank or service provider
through the agent [17], [25].
T5. The browser or client application agent acts as the
middle man and virtual interface between the client and the
bank or payment service provider. This relationship presents
a threat of mistreating the customer or providing inferior
service through bad presentation, miscommunication or poor
service quality. All these factors threaten the brand, repu-
tation and, most importantly, the trust relationship between
the user and bank or payment provider [26], [27].
T6. Intruders can decompile and repackage the browser
application with inserted malicious code. Software Develop-
ment Kits (SDK) and libraries are readily available on the
internet making it easy for anyone to develop and deploy
an application simulating an authentic software agent. Open
source and the connectedness of expert resources around
the world has made it easier to outsource parts and portions
of software functions to open source communities. Open
source projects such as OpenSSL and TOR are open to
recompilations, repackaging and application simulation [13].
T7. The operating environment, such as Android and
Windows, can also present its vulnerabilities which can
extend onto the browser application, therefore, exposing
the data and operations performed by the client through
the software agent to external threats. This can be through
means of inter-application communication or other security
exploitations like memory access, weak permissions man-
agement and low-level API access [19], [20], [21].
T8. The browser application, being generic by nature of
its design, does not place emphasis and priority on com-
pliance with banking and payments industry standards and
regulations such as PCI standard and published legal regu-
lations [14], [21]. Similarly, non-conformance with privacy
laws and data retention policies in the different jurisdictions
and countries exposes the service provider to legal risks [9].
4.2. Threat Analysis of Networking Agent
Software agents in their majority rely on the networking
agent to ensure reliable and, at most times secure, delivery
of the message contents between the agent and host or
another agent party in between. This is the local software
agent responsible for packaging the messages between the
browser and the e-commerce merchant web server. This
software is embedded as firmware in the form of dedicated
micro-controllers inside networking equipment routers and
switches as well as suites of applications installed at the
Internet Service Provider (ISP). In addition to relaying or
routing the messages, the networking agent can profile the
user as well as gain access to some or all the clear unen-
crypted data. The following threats have been identified for
the type of software agent:
T1. Networking agents may present Internal software
attack risks, such as the OpenSSL heartbeat vulnerability
which lead to the Heartbleed attack.
T2. The software responsible for packaging and mes-
sage transportation has capabilities to leak information and
profile both the client and principal for usages, frequency of
transacting and possibly leak the payment transaction data.
T3. Of the level at which the networking agent operates,
they cannot be easily detectable and as such users are not
aware of their existence or even their expected call to action.
T4. The networking agent can be intercepted, and man-
in-the-middle attacked through insecure networks and in-
frastructure. A typical example is the MITM Heartbleed
attack on the widely used OpenSSL, which risks any and
all applications that relied on it for security on the channel.
T5. The networking agent can give substandard service
by throttling or setting lower priority to the e-commerce
client and merchant thus providing an inferior service. The
unknowing client assumes this to be the service of the
merchant which threaten the brand, reputation and most
importantly the trust relationship of the bank or payment
provider.
T6. Open source and the connectedness of expert re-
sources around the world has made it easier to outsource
parts and portions of software functions to open source
communities. Open source projects such as OpenSSL and
TOR are open to recompilations, repackaging and applica-
tion simulation [13].
T7. The operating environment, such as Linux and Win-
dows, can also present its own vulnerabilities which can ex-
tend onto the networking agent software, therefore, exposing
the data and operations performed by the client through the
software agent to external threats. The success of the Target
data breach was due to environmental vulnerabilities that
were compromised through the heating, ventilation and air-
condition system.
T8. The internet service provider software can unduly
maintain some of the logs and transportation data in conflict
with banking and payments industry standards and regula-
tions this further extends to non-conformance with privacy
laws and data retention policies in the different jurisdictions.
4.3. Threat Analysis of Server Application Agent
This is the principal e-commerce retailers web site ap-
plication that contains the logic, content and processes to
advertise and sell the product. This can also be the banks vir-
tual branch in the form of Internet Banking. The web server
is responsible for guiding the client through the purchase
transaction process up to the point of taking payment, which
could be a process undertaken by or delegated to the client
application agent. Although by in large it is controlled and
maintained by the principal (the bank or payment service
provider), the server application agent executes remotely
on the clients computer or mobile device inside the client
application agent (the browser) which presents the following
threats.
T3. Due to a general lack of knowledge to make the right
choices, the unsuspecting user may install malicious browser
plug-ins, helpers and extensions, accept weak settings as
well as incorrectly grant access to the application to mine
personal information or obtain unwarranted access to the
users banking account. This can extend further to other
personal information threats such as phishing attacks [24].
T7. The operating environment, such as Android and
Windows present vulnerabilities to the e-commerce virtual
mall or Internet Banking virtual branch, therefore, exposing
the data and operations performed by the client through the
software agent to external threats such as memory leaks,
weak permissions management and data access [19], [20],
[21].
4.4. Threat Analysis of Authorisation Agent
These are the account velocity, fraud monitoring and
alert systems deployed by the bank or payment provider.
These can also be user profiling software that guides the
merchant or bank for marketing purposes.
T1. Interfacing with or embedding external or third
party software exposes the authorisation agent to Internal
software attack risks such as injection of malicious code for
predictable outcomes.
T2. The software responsible for alerting against fraud
and malicious actions or guiding the bank towards preven-
tative measures can also capture the resulting outcomes for
marketing and other unintended purposes.
T4. Data within the authorisation agent domain can be
intercepted and manipulated for malicious gain. In May
2016, over 8 million was fraudulently withdrawn from cash
machines from a South African bank [28] in a space of a
few hours without the awareness from the banks alert and
monitoring systems.
T5. The authorisation agent can miscalculate a condition
and incorrectly grant/deny access to the end user. The South
African heist incident reported in [28] is a typical example.
This can further be supported by the growing number of
Ransomware incidents where institutions databases are con-
cealed to deny service, however, what is more pertinent to
this research is the unpredictable response and judgement
of the authorisation agent in such an event.
T6, T7. Due to their autonomy and delegation to third
party providers, authorisation agents are susceptible to oper-
ating system threats as well as recompilations, repackaging
and application simulation [13], [29].
T8. The authorisation agent can maintain logs and data
outside its mandate with the principal bank therefore in
violation of the industry norms and standards.
4.5. Agent Threats Comparison
Table 2 summarises and compares the threats identified
in the respective agent types. This comparison illustrates
the prevalence of threats 1 through to 8 in the Client
Application, Networking and the Authorisation Agents in-
dicating grave challenges in the present implementation of
software agent relationships in internet banking and mobile
payments. The Server Application agent observes the user
impersonation and external threats due to environmental vul-
nerabilities such the recent spread of Ransomware attacks.
The Authorisation agent does not record the impersonation
threat as it operates within a trusted environment on data that
should already have been pre-authenticated. The underlying
outcome is that none of the categorised agent types are
exempt from any serious threats.
TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF THREATS ON DIFFERENT SOFTWARE
AGENTS
Agent Type T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9
Client App. X X X X X X X X X
Networking X X X X X X X X X
Server App. X X
Authorisation X X X X X X X X
5. Conclusion
Software agents are delegated subcontractors essential to
connect the end-user to the bank and payment providers in a
distributed service offering. Trust is a vital component in the
continued acceptance and maintenance of reliable remote
payment and banking of which these delegated software
agents are key to its accomplishment. This paper evaluated
the critical role that the different software agent types play to
facilitate collaboration between clients and banks to perform
online transactions. It highlights the threats and impending
risks that these software agents introduce in the chain as well
as how these threats affect the trust relationship between
principals. Some risks have questioned the bank or payment
provider’s execution of its obligations to the client, the
legal and regulatory bodies and its business mandate. The
discussed threats and resulting risks expose vulnerabilities
in the current software agent model which are beyond the
bank and the end users control. Both the client and bank are
open to liabilities and security risks as well as confidentiality
and privacy compromises affecting the trust relationship.
This security vulnerable environment makes it difficult,
if not impossible, for the banks to guarantee the quality
and service offering due to the possibility of interception of
user credentials and personal data that can occur anywhere
in the distribution, including inside the agent itself, which
by virtue of reliability or continued use may have won the
users confidence. We identify a gap of misfortune to both
principals (the bank and client) emanating from the pre-
sented inadequacies in the existing software agent models.
An opportunity exists for a different software agent that is
representative of both the client and the service provider’s
interests to forge and maintain trust relationships between
these parties in open distributed computer systems.
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